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pioneered by Hellerstein and Neumark (1995), which allows us to compare direct estimates of a 
gender productivity differential with those of a gender labour costs differential. We take advantage 
of the panel structure of the data set and identify gender wage discrimination from within-firm 
variation.  Moreover,  inspired  by  recent  developments  in  the  production  function  estimation 
literature, we address the problem of endogeneity in input choice using a structural production 
function estimator (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Our results suggest that there is no gender wage 
discrimination inside private firms located in Belgium. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Evidence  of  substantial  average  earning  differences  between  men  and  women—  what  is  often 
termed the gender pay gap — is a systematic and persistent social outcome in the labour markets of 
most developed economies. This social outcome is often perceived as inequitable by a large section 
of the population and it is generally agreed that its causes are complex, difficult to disentangle and 
controversial (Cain, 1986). In 1999, the gross pay gap between women and men in the EU-27 was, 
on average, 16% (European Commission, 2007), while in the U.S. this figure amounted to 23.5% 
(Blau and Kahn, 2000). Belgian statistics (Institut pour l‟￩galit￩ des Femmes et des Hommes, 2006) 
suggest gross monthly gender wage gaps ranging from 30% for white-collar workers to 21% for 
blue-collar workers.
1 
Although historically decreasing the gender pay gap, and particularly the objective of further 
reducing  its  magnitude,  remains  a  central  political  objective  in  governments‟  agendas  both  in 
Europe and in the U.S.
2  The gender pay gap provides a measure of what Cain (1986) considers the 
practical  definition  of  gender  d iscrimination.  In  Cain‟s  conceptual  framework  gender 
discrimination, as measured by the gender pay gap, is an observed and quantified outcome that 
concerns individual members of a minority group, women, and that manifests itself by a lower pay 
with respect to the majority group, men.  
From an economic point of view, gender wage discrimination implies that equal labour services 
provided by equally productive workers have a sustained price/wage difference.
3 This question has 
motivated the emergence of diverse concepts and theories of wage discrimination. Starting with 
Becker (1957) several theoretical models have been proposed to describe the emergence and 
persistence  of  wage  discrimination  under  diverse  economic  sett ings.  The  development  of  a 
theoretical literature on gender wage discrimination was accompanied by empirical work devoted to 
testing the theoretical predictions of the models and to the measurement of some concept of gender 
wage discrimination. We briefly  describe the most important theories of gender discrimination in 
the  labour  market  and  the  main  empirical  approaches  to  the  measurement  of   gender  wage 
                                                 
1   These are figures for the private sector. The gap in the public sector is only 5%. 
2   See European Commission (2007) for an assessment of the gender pay g ap in the European Union member  states 
and Blau and Kahn (2000), for a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the gender pay gap in the U.S. 
3   In this paper, we will refer to labour costs differences and assume that they are good proxies for wages/earnings. 3 
discrimination in Section 2.  
In this paper we measure, and test for, the presence of gender wage discrimination (as traditionally 
defined by economists) in the Belgian labour market by employing a methodological approach, 
pioneered by Hellerstein & Neumark (1995), using a large data set that matches firm-level data, 
retrieved  from  Belfirst
4, with data from B elgian‟s  Social  Security  register  containing  detailed 
information about the characteristics of the employees in those firms. This methodological approach 
uses firm-level data to identify and measure gender wage discrimination as the gap between a 
measure of women‟s compensation relative to men‟s (the gender wage differential)
5 and a measure 
of women‟s productivity relative to men‟s (the gender productivity differential).
6  
Its main advantages over competing methodologies (see Section 2) are essentially two. First, it 
provides a direct measure of gender productivity differences that can be subsequently compared to a 
measure  of  gender  labour  costs  differences,  thereby  identifying  gender  wage  discrimination. 
Second,  it  measures,  and  tests  for  the  presence  of,  a  concept  of  market-wide  gender  wage 
discrimination.  Hellerstein  &  Neumark‟s  methodology  has  also  been  used  to  test  other  wage 
formation  theories,  most  notably  those  investigating  the  relationship  between  wages  and 
productivity  along  age  profiles,  e.g.  Hellerstein  &  Neumark  (1995).  Extensions  of  the  basic 
methodology include enlarging the scope of workers characteristics, such as age, race and marital 
status, e.g. Hellerstein et al. (1999) or Vandenberghe & Waltenberg (2010), and the consideration of 
richer data sets regarding employee information, e.g. Crépon, Deniau & Pérez-Duarte (2002). In 
this paper, we will focus on gender and also the interaction between gender and the worker‟s blue- 
vs. white-collar status.
 7 
From the econometric standpoint, recent developments of Hellerstein & Neumark‟s methodology 
have tried to  improve the estimation  of the production function by the adoption of  alternative 
                                                 
4   http://www.bvdep.com/en/bel-first.html 
5   Our measure exploits labour costs data (that include gross wage and social security contributions) which are very 
good proxy of what employees get paid. 
6   As to the terminology used in the paper, the reader should bear in mind that the term “differential” designates the 
productivity (or labour costs) differences between women and the reference (i.e. men); whereas the term “gap” 
refers to the difference between the productivity and the labour costs differentials characterizing women vis-à-vis 
men. 
7   Historically in Belgium, white collars (or  “employees”) were those performing work that requires predominantly 
mental rather than physical effort (presumably educated people thus), whereas the blue collars (or “workmen”) were 
employed in manual/ unskilled labour. But that distinction has partially lost its relevance, particularly for the white-
collar group that now encompasses a rather heterogeneous set of activities and levels of education). The distinction 
also largely recoups separate industrial relation arrangements (different rights and obligations in terms of notice 
period, access to unemployment insurance benefits…). 4 
strategies  to  deal  with  potential  heterogeneity  bias  (unobserved  time-invariant  determinants  of 
firms‟ productivity)  and simultaneity bias (endogeneity in input choice in the short run that include 
the gender mix of the firm). Aubert & Crépon (2004) control for the heterogeneity bias using a 
«within»  transformation,  thereby  identifying  gender  wage  discrimination  from  within-firm 
variation,  and  deal  with  the  simultaneity  bias  by  estimating Arellano  &  Bond‟s  (1991)  GMM 
(Generalized  Method  of  Moments)  estimator.    Dostie  (2006)  alternatively  controls  for  the 
endogeneity  in  input  choice  by  applying  Levinsohn  and  Petrin‟s  (2003)  structural  production 
function estimator and takes into account both firm and workplace heterogeneity in the model of 
wage determination.  
We  follow  the  most  recent  applications  of  Hellerstein  &  Neumark‟s  methodology  and  explore 
within-firm variation provided by panel data to identify gender wage discrimination. Next, we deal 
with potential endogeneity in input choice by implementing Levinsohn and Petrin‟s (henceforth LP) 
(2003) intermediate good proxy approach that we implement using information on firms‟ varying 
level of intermediate consumption. 
8  
Finally is important to stress that  we possess (and make systematic use of) firm-level information 
on the total number of hours worked annually. We divide the latter by the number of employees 
(full-time or part-time ones indistinctively) and use the result (average hours worked) as a control 
variable for both the production and the labour cost equations. There is evidence in our data that 
average  hours  worked  is  negatively  correlated  with  the  share  of  female  work:  something  that 
reflects women‟s higher propensity to work part-time, but that crucially needs to be controlled for to 
properly capture the productivity (and labour costs) effect of changes in the share of female work.
 
Our preferred estimates indicate that the cost of employing women
9 is 6 percentage points lower 
than that of men, pointing at a wage differential of similar magnitude. But on average, women‟s 
collective contribution to a firm‟s value added (or productivity) is estimated to be about 6 to 12 
percentage points lower than that the group of male workers. The key result of the paper, however, 
is that we cannot not reject the hypothesis that the estimated gender labour costs/wage differential 
is equal to the estimated gender productivity differential. Our implementation of a Wald test of 
equality does not lead us to reject the null hypothesis of equality between these two differentials. 
                                                 
8   It is calculated here as the differences between the firm‟s turnover (in nominal terms) and its net value-added. It 
reflects the value of goods and services consumed or used up as inputs in production by enterprises, including raw 
materials, services bought on the market. 
9   And presumably their wage. 5 
The  tentative  conclusion  is  that,  for  private  for-profit  firms  based  in  Belgium,  productivity 
differences between male and female workers fully account for labour costs differences. 
Our labour cost estimates are consistent with evidence obtained in previous studies of the gender 
pay  gap  in  the  Belgian  labour  market  (Meulders  &  Sissoko,  2002),  in  the  sense  that  they 
systematically point at lower pay for women.  But our work adds new results to previous evidence 
for two reasons mainly. First, because we use firm-level data we are also able to estimate gender 
productivity differences and show that firm employing more women tend to generate less value 
added  ceteris  paribus.  Second,  by  estimating  labour  costs  and  productivity  equations 
simultaneously we are able to show that there is no statistically significant gap between the gender 
labour cost differential and the gender productivity differential: something that we interpret at the 
absence of wage discrimination. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2 we briefly describe the most 
important  theories  of  gender  discrimination  and  review  alternative  empirical  approaches  to 
Hellerstein  &  Neumark‟s  methodology.  Section  3  describes  the  methodological  approach:  the 
labour-quality-index-augmented production function and labour costs equation specifications are 
presented in subsection 3.1; subsection 3.2 provides a description of the econometric model that 
underlies our empirical analysis; finally, the model of firms‟ behaviour underlying LP‟s production 
function estimator is sketched in subsection 3.3. Section 4 describes the data and presents summary 
statistics. In Section 5 we present, discuss and interpret the results of our preferred econometric 
specifications.  Section 6 summarizes and concludes our analysis.  
 
2 Literature 
This section briefly describes the most important theories of gender discrimination related to the 
labour  market  and  the  empirical  approaches  that  have  been  used  to  quantify  gender  wage 
discrimination.  
2.1 Theories and Concepts of Economic Discrimination. 
In framing the theoretical discussion on economic discrimination it is convenient to distinguish i) 
concepts  of  economic  discrimination  (the  way  is  defined)  from  ii)  theories  of  economic 6 
discrimination (the mechanisms that cause wage discrimination or that are likely to counteract this 
phenomenon).  
We  start  with  the  concepts,  namely  gender  wage  discrimination  and  gender  employment 
discrimination. Gender wage discrimination concerns the observation of sustained differences in 
pay between men and women with equally productive capacity. Some of its constituents deserve 
attention. First, its focus is individual differences in pay of members of different groups for the 
remuneration of some service provided in a formal labour market. Second, the content of the term 
"equal productive capacity" requires substantiation: it refers to the output of a broad definition of 
some material or physical production process, which therefore excludes potential psychic disutility 
to  employers,  workers  or  costumers  associated  with  the  provision  of  those  services.  Gender 
employment discrimination concerns a differential  treatment of  women  with  respect to  men in 
hiring and promotion decisions by employers.  
We now turn to economic theories of discrimination, focusing on their prediction regarding the 
prevalence  and  persistence  of  wage  discrimination.  The  neoclassical  literature  identifies  three 
mechanisms that generate wage differences above productivity differences between women and 
men in the labour market.  
The first and most famous theory of economic discrimination is due to Becker (1957). In Becker‟s 
model, employers hold a „taste for discrimination,‟ meaning that there is a disutility to employing 
minority workers (e.g. women). Hence, minority workers may have to „compensate‟ employers by 
being more productive at a given wage or, equivalently, by accepting a lower wage for identical 
productivity.  However,  the  central  prediction  derived  from  Becker‟s  various  models  is  that  the 
efficiency  costs  associated  with  prejudiced  preferences  by  employers  would  eliminate  wage 
discrimination in the long run.
10  
However, taste-based discrimination theories lead to substantially different predictions when search 
friction environments are analyzed. The central intuition is that under imperfect information about 
jobs, employees, employers and costumers, the segregation and free-entry mechanisms (in the case 
of  employer  discrimination)  that  drive  out  economic  discrimination  in  Becker‟s  model  may  be 
substantially impaired, so that wage discrimination will likely survive. In a setting with prejudiced 
                                                 
10   As Heckman (1998) points out, this corresponds to the common misinterpretation of Becker‟s model. Indeed, for 
market discrimination to disappear in the long run, either the number of non-discriminatory employers is sufficiently 
large to absorb all the minority group workers, or the supply of entrepreneurs is perfectly elastic in the long run at 
zero price. 7 
costumers,  Borjas  &  Bronars‟  (1989)  conclude  that  wage  discrimination  for  low-skilled  self-
employed workers of the minority group relative to the majority group is sustainable in the long 
run. Similarly, Sasaki (1999) shows that wage discrimination is sustainable in the long run when co-
workers rather than employers discriminate against the minority group. Finally, Bowlus & Eckstein 
(2002) and Rosén (2003) show, under diverse assumptions, that when employers are prejudiced 
wage discrimination may not be eliminated in the long run.  
A  second  discrimination  mechanism  is  identified  by  theories  of  statistical  discrimination,  first 
presented by Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972). These theories describe how imperfect information 
about  workers‟  productivity  and  turnover  propensity  may  generate  group  discrimination  in  a 
competitive setting where discriminating by membership to some group provides a cheap screen to 
employers. A first class of models stress the role of prior beliefs about group productivity and 
turnover propensity differences, leading to biased hiring and pay decisions. Work by Coate and 
Loury  (1993b)  has  shown  that  statistical  discrimination  can  lead  to  an  equilibrium  where  an 
otherwise equally skilled minority group ends up with different levels of skills due to employers‟ 
prior beliefs about group skills differences. A second set of models (e.g. Aigner and Cain, 1977) 
highlights statistical discrimination that is generated by differential reliability of the signal supplied 
by each group. In the latter case this «formulation may be viewed as redefining the productivity of 
workers to include both the workers‟ physical productivity and the information workers convey 
about it» (Cain, 1986). Statistical discrimination theories are thus generically consistent with an 
outcome  of  wage  discrimination,  but,  as  information  about  the  productivity  of  the  individual 
employer is revealed, non-discriminatory employers should adjust wages to productivity, thereby 
eliminating wage discrimination. In this respect, the theoretical prediction is somewhat similar to 
that of Becker‟s taste-based discrimination theories.  
A third discriminatory mechanism in the labour market is known as the crowding hypothesis, and 
was  first  formalized  in  Bergmann  (1971).  Suppose  that,  for  some  reason  —  be  it  collective 
discriminatory action or individual employer taste-based discrimination (e.g. Bergmann, 1974) — 
the minority group employment opportunities are restricted to a specific set of occupations. Then, if 
the size of the minority group is large enough relative to the employment opportunities in the set of 
specific occupations, two effects would come about. First, labour market clearance for the specific 
occupation would entail a reduction in productivity, and thus wages, of the employed minority 
group.  Second,  under  the  assumption  of  equally  productive  capacity  of  the  two  groups,  the 
opportunity cost of the minority group would be lower with respect to the majority group. While 8 
the first effect does not entail wage discrimination but only lower productivity and wages for the 
minority  group,  the  second  effect  can  generate  wage  discrimination  in  the  non-segregated 
occupations.  
Beyond theories of gender wage and employment discrimination, and consequently beyond the 
focus of this paper, research efforts have also been directed at investigating the impact of group 
differences in preferences and skills in labour market outcomes. These models rationalize observed 
differences in pay by hypothesizing differences between the minority and majority groups with 
respect to preferences for market versus non-market work, leisure or occupations, differences in 
comparative advantage and differences in human capital investment (Altonji & Blank, 1999).  
2.2 Empirics of Gender Economic Discrimination  
The focus of most of the empirical literature on gender wage discrimination has been on identifying 
and measuring gender discrimination rather than testing the theoretical predictions of some specific 
theory of discrimination. The standard empirical  approach to  the measurement of  gender wage 
discrimination  consists  of  estimating  wage  equations  and  applying  Oaxaca  (1973)  and  Blinder 
(1973) decomposition methods. In wage equations, wage discrimination is measured as the average 
mark-up,  on  some  measure  of  individual  compensation,  associated  to  the  membership  to  the 
minority group, controlling for individual productivity-related characteristics. In Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition method the difference in the average wage of the minority group relative to the 
majority group is explained by what Beblo et al. (2003) call the endowment effect (i.e. the effect of 
differing human capital endowments, diploma, experience but also ability) and the remuneration 
effect (i.e. different remunerations of the same endowments). And the remuneration effect has been 
traditionally interpreted as a measure of wage discrimination in the labour market.  
The main shortcoming of this approach is that its identification strategy relies on the assumption 
that individuals are homogeneous in any productivity-related characteristic that is not included in 
the set of variables describing individuals‟ endowment. Two problems, one theoretical and another 
empirical, emerge. First, the researcher has to choose a set of potential individual productivity-
related  characteristics  (diploma,  experience,  ability…).  Second,  he  needs  to  find  or  create 
appropriate  measures  of  those  characteristics.  While  the  second  problem  is  becoming  more 
manageable with the recent availability of rich individual-level data sets, the first problem can 
never be fully solved without using some measure of individual productivity. Furthermore, insofar 
has discrimination affects individual choices regarding human capital  decisions or occupational 9 
choices,  the  measure  of  discrimination  obtained  from  wage  equations  will  likely  understate 
discrimination (Altonji & Blank, 1999).  
Studies of narrowly-defined occupations and audit studies attempt to provide escape routes from 
these  problems.  Studies  of  narrowly-defined  occupations  estimate  male  and  female  wage 
differentials in specific occupations assuming that sector-specificity is sufficient to eliminate the 
heterogeneity  in  workers  productivity-related  characteristics  (Gunderson,  2006).  In  some  cases 
direct  measures  of  productivity  are  used  to  compare  estimates  of  wage  and  productivity 
differentials. In our view, this approach suffers from two drawbacks.  First, assuming away the 
omitted-variable bias is never fully satisfactory from the methodological point of view. Second, the 
identification  of  gender  discrimination  is  subject  to  sector-  and  occupation-specific  biases,  e.g 
presence of rents that allow employers to indulge in gender discrimination etc. Audit studies, e.g. 
Neumark (1996), directly test for employment rather than wage discrimination by comparing the 
probability  of  being  interviewed  and  the  probability  of  being  hired  of  essentially  identical 
individuals  aside  from  the  membership  to  the  minority  group. Audit  studies  also  face  serious 
empirical  challenges  in  ensuring  that  their  methodological  requirements  are  satisfied  (e.g. 
guaranteeing a large number of testers, auditors homogeneity etc.). More importantly, audit studies 
do not identify employment discrimination occurring at the market level, indeed Heckman (1998) 
notes that  «a well-designed audit study  could uncover many individual firms that discriminate, 
while at the same time the marginal effect of discrimination on the wages of the employed workers 
could be zero».  
As we mentioned in the introductory section, in this paper we implement an empirical methodology 
that involves obtaining estimates of firm-level direct measures of gender productivity and wage 
differentials via, respectively, the estimation of a production function and a labour costs equation 
both  expanded  by  the  specification  of  a  labour-quality  index.  Under  proper  assumptions  (see 
Section  3.1)  the  comparison  of  these  two  estimates  provides  a  direct  test  for  gender  wage 
discrimination. One advantage of this setting is that it does not rely on productivity indicators taken 
at the individual level, which are known to be difficult to measure with precision, but rather at the 
aggregate level, namely, for groups of workers.  
Moreover, because this approach uses information about firms of all sectors of the economy it 
properly  measures,  and  tests  for,  a  concept  of  market-wide  gender  discrimination.  Therefore, 
Hellerstein & Neumark‟s methodology addresses some of the main identification problems of the 
existing empirical methodologies. Of course, in spite of its power Hellerstein & Neumark‟s gender 10 
discrimination test is not bullet-proof. However, compared to Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based 
on wage equations, it does not identify as gender discrimination gender wage differences that are 
explained by gender productivity differences. 
 3 Econometric modelling and methodology 
 
3.1 Specification of the Productivity and Wage Differentials 
In  order  to  estimate  gender-productivity  (and  similarly  gender-wage  profiles),  following  many 
authors in this area, we first consider a Cobb-Douglas production function (Hellerstein et al., 1999; 
Aubert & Crépon, 2004; Dostie, 2006) 
log Yit = ʱ log Lit
A +ß logKit   (1) 
where: Y is the value added by firm i at time t, L
A is an aggregation of different types of workers, K 
is the capital stock, and μ is the error term.  
The key variable in this production function is the quality of labour aggregate L
A. Let Likt be the 
number of workers of type k (women vs. men…) in firm i at time t, and µ be their productivity. We 
assume that workers of various types are substitutable with different marginal product. And each 
type  of  worker  k  is  assumed  to  be  an  input  in  the  production  function.  The  aggregate  can  be 
specified as: 
Lit
A = ∑k µik Likt = µi0 Lit + ∑k >0 (µik - µi0) Likt  (2) 
where Lit is the total number of workers in the firm, µ0 the productivity of the reference category of 
workers (e.g. men). Extensions of the basic methodology include enlarging the scope of workers‟ 
type, such as race and marital status, e.g. Hellerstein &Neumark (1995), Hellerstein et al. (1999) or 
age Vandenberghe & Waltenberg (2010). Here types refer exclusively to different gender or (as part 
of a extension aimed at assessing the robustness of our results) gender interacted with white- vs. 
blue-collar status. 
If  we  further  assume  that  a  worker  has  the  same  marginal  product  across  firms,  we  can  drop 
subscript i and rewrite equation (2) as: 
Log Lit
A = log µ0 + log Lit + log (1+ ∑k >0 (λk  - 1) Pikt)  (3) 11 
where λk≡µk/µ0 the relative productivity of type k worker and Pik= Lik/Li0 is the proportion/share of 
type k workers (e.g. share of women..) over the total number of workers in firm i . 
Since log(1+x)≈ x, we can approximate (3) by: 
Log Lit
A = log µ0 + log Lit + ∑k >0 (λk  - 1) Pikt  (4) 
And the production function becomes: 
log Yit = ʱ [log µ0 + log Lit
 +
 ∑k >0 (λk -1) Pikt] + ß logKit   (5) 
 
Or, equivalently, if k=0,1,….N with k=0 being the reference group (e.g. men) 
yit = A + ʱ lit
 + η1 Pi1t + … ηN PiNt+ß kit   (6) 
where: 
A =ʱ log λ0  
λk=µk/µ0   k-=1…N 
 
η1 = ʱ (λ1  – 1) 
…. 





Note first that (6) being loglinear in P the coefficients can be directly interpreted as the percentage 
change in productivity of a 1 unit (here 100%) change of the considered type of workers‟ share 
among the employees of the firm. Note also  that, strictly speaking, in order to obtain a type‟s 
relative productivity, (i.e. λk), coefficients ηk have to be divided by ʱ, and 1 needs to be added to the 
result. 
 
In order to test the null hypothesis of no gender wage discrimination we still need to define a labour 
costs/wage equation to obtain an estimate of the gender wage differential. Under the identifying 
assumptions of spot labour markets and cost-minimizing firms, male and female workers should be 
paid according to their marginal product. Let the total labour costs of a firm (LC) be decomposed in 
two components: labour costs with male workers (k=0) and labour costs with female workers (k>0). 12 
By assumption, firms operate in the same labour market.
11  So they pay the same wages to the same 
category of workers (we can thus drop subscript i), which in our framework is the only feature that 
differentiates workers. Let πk stand for the remuneration of type k workers. Then:  
 
LCit = ∑k πk Likt =π0 Lit + ∑k >0 (πk - π0) Likt  (7) 
 
Taking the log and using again log(1+x)≈ x, we can approximate this by: 
log LCit = log π0 + log Lit + ∑k >0 (ʦk  - 1) Pikt  (8) 
 
where the Greek letter ʦk ≡ πk/ π0 denotes the yearly labour costs differential between women (k>0) 
and men (k=0), hereafter referred to as the gender wage differential, and Pik= Lik/Li0 is the 
proportion/share of type k workers over the total number of workers in firm i . 
The labour costs/wage model finally becomes: 
wit = B + ρ1 Pi1t + … ρ N PiNt   (9) 
where: 
B = ln π0 
ʦk ≡=πk/ π0   k=1,…N 
ρ 1 = ʦ1  – 1 
…. 
ρ N = ʦN – 1 
wit= ln LCit -  ln Lit  
Note in particular that the dependent variable corresponds to the average labour costs per worker. 
By estimating equation (9) we can directly obtain an estimate of the gender wage differential by 
adding 1 to estimated ρ k. 
The gender wage discrimination test can now be easily formulated. Assuming spot labour markets 
and cost-minimizing firms the null hypothesis of no gender wage discrimination for type k worker 
implies λk=ʦk . Moreover, the gap between the gender productivity differential and the gender wage 
differential provides a quantitative measure of the extent of gender wage discrimination.
12 As it will 
be made clear in Section 5, this is a test we can easily implement in our econometric specifications 
                                                 
11   At least at the sectoral level (NACE2). See next Section 3.2 below to see how we allow for sector (unobserved) 
specificities by resorting to fixed effects. 
12   We assume for presentational simplicity that women are less productive than men,  so that the gender productivity 
differential is below 1. 13 
of the production function and the labour costs equation. 
Assuming that the LP polynomial is a good proxy for short- to medium term productivity shocks 
(an  unobserved  variable  potentially  correlated  with  gender  mix  if  women  are  over  represented 
among temp/part-time contacts), then the unaccounted part of the gender mix variance within firm 
— the one ultimately providing identification — probably reflects the overall rising propensity of 
women to work  or to be allowed to in some sectors due to technical change/retirement of cohorts of 
men embodying outdated gender biased technological constraints. Table 1 in Section 4 shows that 
the overall share of women was on the rise over the period covered by our survey data. 
3.2. Identifying the production function 
We now consider the econometric version of our linearised Cobb-Douglas model (10). Note first 
that we have added a matrix Fit, wherein we concentrate region (#3), year (#8), sector
13 (#76), and 
(the log of) average hours worked .
14 The latter aims at capturing women‟s higher propensity to 
work part-time and controlling for spurious productivity and labour costs effects this may entail 
when the share of female work changes over time inside a firm.  
The extension of the production function by introducing year, sector and region dummies allows for 
systematic  and  proportional  productivity  variation  among  firms  along  these  dimensions.  This 
assumption  can  be  seen  to  expand  the  model  by  controlling  for  year-  and  sector-  specific 
productivity shocks, labour quality and intensity of efficiency wages differentials across sectors and 
other  sources  of  systematic  productivity  differentials  (Hellerstein  &Neumark,  1995).  More 
importantly, since the data set we used did not contain sector price deflators, the introduction of 
these sets of dummies can control for asymmetric variation in the price of firms‟ outputs at sector. 
An extension along the same dimensions is made with respect to the labour costs equation. We 
recall that the labour costs equation is definitional: under the assumption of cost-minimizing firms 
that operate in the same competitive labour market, all workers in the same demographic categories 
earn the same wage. By introducing year, region and sector controls we consider the possibility that 
firms operate in year-, region- and sector-specific labour markets
15 and, therefore, allow for wage 
variation  along  these  dimensions.  Of  course,  the  assumption  of  segm ented  labour  markets, 
implemented by adding linearly to the labour costs equation the set of dummies, is valid as long 
                                                 
13   NACE2 level. See Appendix for detailed list. 
14   Total hours worked on an annual basis divided by the number of employees (part-time, full-time.). 
15   It is probably the sector dimension that is the most relevant in the case of Belgium. 14 
there is proportional variation in wages by gender along those dimensions (Hellerstein &Neumark, 
1995).  
yit = A + ʱ lit
 + η1 Pi1t + … ηN PiNt+ß kit +γFit + ʵit  (10) 
where ʵit =θi + ωit + ˃it   
where: cov(θi, Pi1,t) ≠ 0 and/or cov(θi, Pi2,t) ≠ 0 , cov(ωit, Pi1,t) ≠ 0 and/or cov(ωit, Pi2,t) ≠ 0, E(˃it)=0 
But from an econometric point of view, the main challenge consists of dealing with the various 
constituents of the residual ʵit of the production function. First, the unobservable (time-invariant) 
heterogeneity across firms, θi. The latter corresponds to specific characteristics of the firm, which 
are  unobservable  but  driving  the  productivity  while  also  being  correlated  with  the  explanatory 
variable of interest (here the share of women vs. men); for example the age of the plan, the vintage 
of capital used. Male workers might be overrepresented among plants built a long time ago, that use 
older heavy equipment that is intrinsically more difficult to operate for female employees. The 
panel  structure  of  our  data  allows  us  to  use  fixed-effects  or  other  within  methods  like  first 
difference, attenuating that problem in many of the specifications. 
However,  the  greatest  econometric  challenge  is  to  go  around  simultaneity  or  endogeneity  bias 
(Griliches & Mairesse, 1995). The economics underlying that concern is intuitive. In the short run 
firms could be confronted to productivity shocks, ωit,(say, a positive shock due to a turnover, itself 
the consequence of a missed sales opportunity). Contrary to the econometrician, firms may know 
about this and respond by expanding recruitment of temporary- or part-time staff.  Since the latter is 
predominantly female, we should expect that the share of female employment should increase in 
periods of positive productivity shocks and decrease in periods of negative shocks. This would 
generate spurious positive correlation between the share of female labour force and the productivity 
of firms, thereby leading to underestimated OLS estimates of the gender productivity differential. 
Instrumenting  the  age by  lagged values  is  a  strategy  regularly used in  the production function 
literature (Arellano & Bond, 1991) to cope with this short-term simultaneity bias. Nevertheless, it 
has some limits, among which concerns about the quality of lagged values as instruments, and the 
large  standard  errors  usually  found,  which  make  it  difficult  to  draw  solid  conclusions.
16  A 
development of that procedure, which has been proposed by Blundell & Bond (2000), is a system-
                                                 
16   These limits have been acknowledged by Aubert & Crépon (2004), who applied such strategy to French data, and 
are also mentioned by Dostie (2006) or Roodman (2006). 15 
GMM,  in  which  the  endogenous  variables  are  instrumented  with  variables  considered  to  be 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects and estimated by GMM. Still in this case, there are at least two 
types of problems: i) the estimated results are typically extremely sensitive to a great number of 
methodological choices (e.g., the number of lags for each variable), and, ii) instruments are often 
weakly identified, casting doubts on the quality of the estimations. 
3.3. The intermediate input proxy approach to simultaneity bias 
An alternative that seems to be particularly promising and relevant given the content of our data it 
to adopt the approach suggested by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) and used, for example, by Dostie 
(2006). Their idea is that firms primarily respond to productivity shocks ωit by adapting the volume 
of their intermediate inputs. Whenever such kind of information is available in a data set — which 
happens to be the case with ours as we have information on intermediate consumption (more on this 
in Section 4) — they can be used to proxy productivity shocks. An advantage with respect to the 
system-GMM method mentioned above is that this method based on intermediate inputs does not 
carry the burden of relying on instruments that lack a clear-cut economic meaning and which are, as 
mentioned above, typically weak.
17 Moreover, by using the LP method, the number of discretionary 
methodological  choices  that  have  to  be  made  by  the  researchers is  reduced,  contributing  to 
providing results which are easier to understand and to compare with others in the literature.
18  
Formally, the demand for intermediate inputs would be a function of productivity shocks as well as 
the level of capital: 
intit =I(ωit , kit)  (11) 
Assuming this function is monotonic in ω and k, it can be inverted to deliver an expression of ωit as 
a function of int and k. Expression (10) thus becomes: 
yit = A + ʱ lit
 + η1 Pi1t + … ηN PiNt+ß kit +γFit + θi + ωit(intit) + ʵit  (12) 
with: ωit(intit) that can be approximated by a polynomial expansion in int.  
                                                 
17   That is instruments are only weakly correlated with the included endogenous variables. 
18   For example, employing the Arellano-Bond method, Aubert & Crépon (2004) have used a different number of lags 
for labour (2 lags) and other variables (all lags). Although they chose to reduce the number of lags for labour in 
order not to inflate too much the orthogonality conditions, it is not clear what procedure has been used to set those 
lags on the specific values they have chosen. We do not know whether their main results would be robust to 
different lag choices. 16 
While the latter technique (in combination of firm fixed effects) is our preferred one, we have 
decided to report results of different econometric techniques, because of the well-known challenges 
and controversies involved in the estimation of any production function (Griliches & Mairesse, 
1995). 
Having  identified  our  preferred  econometric  model,  we  can  precise  the  source  of  identifying 
variance of both λk and ʦk in equations (6),(9). It obviously comes from variation of the share of 
women. But could this reflect employer‟s preferences? 
19 Neumark (1988) shows that if employer's 
discriminatory  behavior  concerns  the  share  of  female  employment  in  each  firm  a nd  if 
discrimination intensity of employers' is variable, then the variation of the share of female in each 
firm is the result of the variation in employer's discriminatory intensity. But our estimation uses 
within- rather than between-variation. The source of change at the firm-level in the share of female 
must  come  fro m  elsewhere.  Our   source  of  identification  cannot  come  from  firm -  specific 
"preferences" as to gender mix. These are wiped out by the fixed effects if we assume that they do 
not vary in the short- to medium run.  What is more,  assuming that the LP  polynomial is a good 
proxy for short- to medium term productivity shocks (an unobserved variable potentially correlated 
with  gender  mix  if  women  are  over  represented  among  temp/part -time  contacts),  th en  the 
unaccounted  part  of  the  gender  mix  variance  within  firm  —  the  one  ultimately  providing 
identification here — is likely to reflect the overall rising propensity of women to work or to be 
allowed to in some sectors due to technical change (deindustrialisation) /retirement of cohorts of 
men  embodying  outdated  gender  biased  technological  constraints.  The  rising  overall  share  of 
women in our sample (from 26 to 28 % between 1998 and 2006) is supportive of this assumption 
(Table 1). 
                                                 
19   In  reference  to  Becker‟s  (1957)  taste-based  discrimination  theory  or  Arrow‟s  (1972)  theory  of  statistical 
discrimination. 17 
4 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The firm-level data we use in this paper involves input and output variables of close to 9,000 firms 
of  the  Belgian  private  economy  observed  along  the  period  1998-2006.  The  data  set  matches 
financial and operational information retrieved from Belfirst with data on individual characteristics 
of all employees working in the firms, obtained from the Belgium‟s Social Security register (the so-
called  Carrefour  database).  The  data  set  covers  all  sectors  in  the  Belgian  non-farming  private 
economy, identified by NACE2 code
6. Monetary values are expressed in nominal terms. 
 
The productivity outcome corresponds to the firms‟ net value added: the value of output less the 
values of both intermediate consumption and consumption of fixed capital. The measure of labour 
costs, which was measured independently of net-value added (Figure 1), includes the value of all 
monetary compensations paid to the total labour force (both full- and part-time, permanent and 
temporary), including social security contributions paid by the employers, throughout the year. The 
summary statistics of the variables in the data set are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
As we have mentioned in the previous section, we control for price variation in firms output by 
using a set of dummies for sector, year and their interaction. In our empirical analysis we use net 
value-added as the measure of firms‟ output. Capital input is measured by fixed tangible assets, 
while labour input corresponds to total number of employees, including both full- and part-time and 
under  permanent  and  temporary  contract,  weighted  by  a  measure  (hours  worked  annually)  of 
relative work intensity in the firm vis-à-vis the sample average.  
 
The fact that we cannot distinguish part- from full-time workers and workers under permanent and 
temporary contract is an important limitation of our empirical analysis, since women are known to 
be overrepresented in part-time and temporary contract. However, note in Table 1 the presence of 
average worked hours. It is obtained by dividing the total number of hours in the firms (on an 
annual  basis)  by  the  number  of  employees  (full-time  or  part-time  ones  indistinctively).  We 
systematically  include  this  ratio  among  our  control  variables.  The  reason  for  this  is  quite 
straightforward. There is evidence in Table 1 that average hours worked is negatively correlated 
with the share of female work. It fell from 1576 hours per employee in 1998 to 1517 hours in 2006 
while the share of women rose from 26% to 28% over the same period of time.  Lesser hours per 
employee  —  driven  by  a  higher  degree  of  feminisation  of  the  workforce  —  logically  reflects 18 
women‟s higher propensity to work part-time. But this is also something that crucially needs to be 
controlled for, in order to properly capture the productivity (and labour costs) effect of changes in 
the share of female workers.  19 
 
Table 1: Belfirst-Carrefour panel. Basic descriptive statistics. Mean (Standard deviation in italics). 



































1998  7584  7,760  4,800  108  6,388  1576  0.263  0.085  0.486  0.177  0.251 
   
50,301  32,805  474  99,443  502  0.245  0.168  0.341  0.205  0.231 
1999  7743  8,192  5,017  111  6,548  1576  0.266  0.085  0.482  0.180  0.252 
   
54,668  32,455  475  103,365  310  0.244  0.167  0.340  0.205  0.229 
2000  7929  8,837  5,314  114  6,857  1566  0.271  0.085  0.475  0.185  0.254 
   
55,296  32,539  472  111,964  324  0.244  0.166  0.339  0.207  0.228 
2001  8121  9,027  5,646  121  7,477  1574  0.274  0.084  0.468  0.189  0.258 
   
53,836  32,959  511  119,272  883  0.244  0.164  0.339  0.209  0.228 
2002  8262  9,565  6,172  128  8,043  1544  0.275  0.082  0.462  0.192  0.263 
   
59,781  39,160  690  130,471  343  0.243  0.162  0.339  0.210  0.230 
2003  8353  10,128  6,384  127  8,508  1531  0.276  0.082  0.459  0.194  0.265 
   
58,778  37,988  643  138,520  301  0.243  0.161  0.339  0.211  0.230 
2004  8355  10,954  6,667  129  8,870  1542  0.276  0.081  0.456  0.194  0.268 
   
63,694  37,649  644  147,481  246  0.242  0.161  0.338  0.210  0.230 
2005  8338  11,438  6,912  132  8,052  1525  0.276  0.080  0.454  0.196  0.270 
   
64,558  37,691  645  62,724  276  0.242  0.159  0.338  0.210  0.230 
2006  8261  12,367  7,311  134  8,250  1517  0.280  0.080  0.448  0.200  0.272 
   
68,878  39,686  638  61,954  1666  0.242  0.158  0.336  0.212  0.230 
a: Total number of hours worked during the year divided by the total number of employee (full-time or part-time ones). 20 
 
Table 2: Belfirst-Carrefour panel. Basic descriptive statistics, pooled data 
Firm size  Nobs 
1-49  44354 
50-99  14664 
100+  13928 
Region 
  Brussels   10722 
Vlaanderen  46008 
Wallonia  16216 
 
Figure 1 shows an expected pattern: a positive relation between firms‟ net value added (our measure 
of output) and their labour costs, with an overwhelming majority of firms reporting lower labour 
costs than their net value added.
20 Figure 2 reveals that productivity variance is higher than labour 
costs variance. It its lower panel, it also suggests that both average labour costs and productivit y 
decline with the (rising) share of women employed by a firm. 
 
Finally, intermediate inputs pay a key role in our analysis, as they are central to our strategy to 
overcome the simultaneity bias.  It is calculated here as the differences between the firm‟s turnover 
(in nominal terms) and its net value-added. It reflects the value of goods and services consumed or 
used up as inputs in production by enterprises, including raw materials, services and various other 
operating expenses. 
                                                 
20   The average productivity/labour costs ratio is 1.42. 21 
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Figure 2: Share of women in firms’ workforce (on the horizontal axis) versus firms’ i) log of net 
value added per employee ii) log of labour costs per employee. Year 2006.  Scatter plot and 
linear fit 
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5 Econometric Analysis 
 
This  section  starts  by  complementing  the  description  and  justification  of  our  methodological 
choices  initiated  in  the  previous  section  (subsection  5.1);  next,  it  analyses  the  results  of  our 
estimations (subsection 5.2) and, finally, interprets the results in light of existing gender economic 
discrimination theories and previous evidence for the Belgian labour market (subsection 5.3). 
 23 
5.1 Empirical Strategy 
 
In Table 3 we present results of the independent estimation of production and the labour costs 
equations under six alternative econometric specifications: standard OLS using total variance [1] 
then  OLS  using  only  between-firm  (or  cross-sectional)  variance  [2].  Then  comes  the  LP 
intermediate consumption “proxy” using total variance [3]. The next model uses first-differenced 
variables [4]. The fifth model is the within model (where each observation has been centred of the 
firm average over the duration of the panel). Finally, our preferred model is the one that combines 
the HP idea and the within-firm model [6].  
 
Further ahead, in Table 4, we will focus on the simultaneous estimation of the production and 
labour  costs  functions  using  our  preferred  model  [6]  with  the  aim  of  assessing  the  statistical 
significance of the gap between gender productivity vs. labour costs differentials.  
 
Specification [6] in Table 4 is a priori the best insofar as the coefficients of interest are identified 
from within-firm variation and that it controls for potential heterogeneity and simultaneity biases 
using LP‟s intermediate input proxy strategy. Heterogeneity bias might be present since our sample 
covers all sectors of the Belgian private economy and the list of controls included in our models is 
limited. Even if the introduction of the set of dummies can account for most of this bias, the «within 
firm» transformation  [5], [6] (or the first-differing one [4]) are still  the most powerful way to 
account of inter-firm unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
On the other hand, the endogeneity in input choice is a largely well documented problem in the 
production function estimation literature (e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1995) and also deserved to be 
properly treated. Moreover, given that our data do not distinguish between part- and full-time and 
temporary  and  permanent  workers  and  that  there  is  evidence  from  the  Belgian  labour  market 
indicating that women tend to  be overrepresented in  part-time  and temporary  employment, the 
presence of simultaneity bias may underestimate the  OLS estimates  of the  gender productivity 
differential.  
 
Despite the considerations we made in the previous paragraphs, we believe specifications [1] to [4] 
provide valuable information about the presence and magnitude of biases, so that we will draw 
tentative evidence from comparison of the results of the alternative specifications.  
 24 
We now make a final a justification for our preferred joint estimations of production and labour cost 
equations (Table 4). We recall that the focus of our analysis is the implementation of the gender 
wage discrimination test, which involves testing the equality of estimates of productivity (λ) and 
labour costs (ʦ) differentials, obtained from estimations of the production function and the labour 
costs equations. Options here are essentially twofold.  
 
First, joint estimation of the two equations (using e.g. the SUREG, Stata command). We recall that 
the arguments for joint estimation — what corresponds to system FGLS estimation in Wooldridge 
(2002)‟s terminology
21 — are essentially two. One is that joint estimation provides a direct way to 
implement a Wald test of the equality of a non-linear combination of coefficients across equations. 
If there are unobservables in both equations that bias the estimates of λ and ʦ, as long as they affect 
the two equations equally, which should occur under the null, their effect on the Wald equality test 
is  neutralized.  Another  is  that  joint  estimation  makes  use  of  cross-equation  correlations  in  the 
errors, thereby increasing the efficiency (i.e. generate smaller standard errors) of the coefficient 
estimates.Alternatively,  one  can  perform  so-called  system  OLS  estimation.  This  consists  of 
estimating the two equations separately, but to use those estimates to construct a cluster-adjusted
22 
robust sandwich variance-covariance matrix, which can be used to perform a Wald test of equality 
of the two coefficients.
23  
 
The choice between system OLS and system FGLS can be viewed as a trade-off between robustness 
and efficiency. On the one hand, system OLS is more robust (i.e. generate coefficient that are less 
likely to be biased). It is consistent under the milder assumption of contemporaneous exogeneity, 
while  the  consistency  of  system  FGLS  is  conditional  on  strict  exogeneity  of  the  regressors. 
Moreover, the Wald test computed from system OLS estimation can be made robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term, while system FGLS does so under the 
assumption of system homoskedasticity. In principle, we could construct a cluster-adjusted robust 
sandwich variance-covariance matrix from the FGLS estimates. However, the Stata command that 
implements FGLS, SUREG, does not permit its computation from standard commands. On the other 
hand, system FGLS takes advantage of increased efficiency from cross-equation correlations in the 
errors.  
                                                 
21   See chapter 7 of Wooldridge (2002) for a derivation of the properties of system OLS and system FGLS estimators. 
22   Here, a cluster is a firm. 
23   See Weesie (2000) for a description of the Stata procedure that constructs a c luster-adjusted robust sandwich 
estimator from two or more sets of independent estimates. 25 
 
We decided to implement system OLS in addition to the more common system FGLS (used for 
instance by  Hellerstein  &Neumark  (1995) and  Hellerstein  et  al.  (1999)  for four reasons.  First, 
because we are using panel data, so that the error term should normally be serially correlated for the 
same firm, the ability to control for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation across time is 
a strong advantage. Second, the advantage of controlling for potential unobservables is substantially 
smaller in our case: while Hellerstein &Neumark (1995) and Hellerstein et al. (1999) used cross 
section data and implemented standard OLS and IV estimators, instead, we use panel data and 
implement  estimation  procedures  specifically  designed  to  deal  with  potential  biases  due  to 
unobservables. Third, the importance of cross-equation correlation in the errors needs to be assessed 
vis-à-vis the efficiency of the estimates obtained from independent estimations. In our case, the 
precision  of  coefficient  estimates  using  system  OLS  is  fairly  satisfactory.  Fourth  and  last,  the 
assumption of strict exogeneity is very strong for production function estimation. That said, the 
efficiency gains associated with system FGLS seem to be high for our data set: the cross-equation 
correlation of the residuals is high both for the raw and the transformed data, respectively 69%, for 
total-firm variation, and 56% for within-firm variation, and 60%, for total-firm variation, and 40% 
for within-firm variation.  
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
  
Table displays the parameter estimates of the production and labour costs functions when these are 
estimated separately. Reported coefficients in the upper parts of the table correspond to η = ʱ(λ-1); 
ρ = ʦ – 1 in equations 6 & 9.  
 
The lower part of Table 3 contains the estimates of the gender productivity (λ) and labour costs (ʦ) 
differentials. Estimated λ point at lower productivity inside firms employing more women. Male to 
female productivity differentials range for 0 to -18 percentage points. Those for ʦ are significant 
and point negative labour costs differentials for women. These range from 0 to -17 percentage 
points. 
 
The crucial issue, however, is the gap between these gender differentials as it captures the intensity 
of gender wage discrimination. We report different estimates of this gap on the bottom line of 
Table 3. OLS estimates (column [1]) suggest that women in the Belgian labour market are paid 12 
percentage point less than what their (relative) productivity would imply.  Turning to the between-26 
firm estimates (were we solely use the between firm variance), we get an even larger gap of 13 
percentage points.  But focusing on the within-firm variance (in order to account for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity) considerably reduces that gap. Indeed, estimates reported in column [5] 
translate into a now negative gap of about 3 percentage points.  And when we combine the within 
approach (to control for time-invariant heterogeneity) and the LP‟s proxy strategy to control for 
short-term endogeneity, we get a negative gap of 6 percentage points. In other words, the gender 
labour costs differential is smaller than the productivity differential.  Although these results require 
further qualifications (more on this below), they suggest that most of the evidence in support of 
gender pay discrimination vanishes once cross-firm unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias 
have been controlled for.  
 
The dramatic reduction of the differential gap when moving from total- to within-firm variance 
constitutes important evidence in support of controlling for cross-firm heterogeneity and rejecting 
OLS  [1],  between  [2]  on  LP-only  [3]  estimates.    This  is  particularly  true  for  the  labour  costs 
equation. The within-firm labour costs differential is much smaller (6 percentage points [5], [6]) 
than in previous models (17 percentage points with OLS [1]
24 see lower part of Table 3).  
 
The  different  estimates  of  the  productivity  differentials  are  also  affected  by  the  within 
transformation, although to a lesser extent than labour cost differentials. Controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity and  simultaneity bias  combining within and LP [6]   leads  to  gender  productivity 
differentials of greater magnitude (-5 percentage points with OLS [1] vs. -13 percentage points with 
our preferred estimate [6], see lower part of Table 3). 
 
The latter results  accords with our initial prediction. Based on evidence for the Belgian labour 
market summarized in Meulders &  Sissoko (2002), we were convinced that, if anything, the 
presence  of  simu ltaneity  bias  would  lead  to  an  underestimation   of  the  gender  productivity 
differential in OLS estimations. Our reasoning was t he following: since in Belgium temporary 
                                                 
24   Note that this estimate of the “gross” gender labour costs differential is quantitatively similar to previous studies of 
the gender wage differential in the Belgium labour market using individual level-data, wage equations and Oaxaca-
Blinder  decomposition  methods.  Jepsen  (2001),  using  1994-95  data  from  the  ECHP  (European  Community 
Household Survey), finds an unadjusted wage gap ratio of 85%, which lowers to 83%, when part-time workers are 
included.  For  the  same  period,  a  report by  the  Belgian  Federal  Ministry  of  Employment  and  Labour,  cited  in 
Meulders & Sissoko (2002), using the same data set as Jepsen (2001) and another data set, SES (Structure of 
Earnings Survey), that only includes data for the private sector, finds an unadjusted gender pay gap of 16% in the 
private sector. 27 
contract employment is asymmetrically concentrated in female employment,
25 we should expect 
that, if temporary employment is one, or the main, labour adjustment variable to shocks in firms 
economic environments, the share of female employment should increa se in periods of positive 
productivity shocks and decrease in periods of negative  productivity shocks. This would generate 
positive correlation between the share of female labour force and the productivity  of firms, thereby 
leading to underestimated OLS estimates of the gender productivity differential. As we have just 
argued our results do confirm this prediction. 
 
But strictly speaking, we cannot conclude to the absence of gender discrimination without properly 
testing for the equality of the gender productivity (λ) and labour costs differentials (ʦ) . Table 4 
presents estimates of λ and ʦ obtained from both system FGLS and system OLS estimations of the 
production function and the labour costs equation, and the p-values of Wald equality tests of these 
coefficients.  
 
With system FGLS, the estimates of λ and ʦ (and the resulting gaps) are approximately the same as 
those obtained from system OLS estimates (Table 4) and, as expected, the precision of the estimates 
increased slightly owing to the high correlation in the residuals across equations (around 60% for 
total-firm estimations and around 40%, for within-firm estimations). But in both cases high p-values 
of the Wald equality tests statistic (0.84 and 0.28 respectively) lead to the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of no gender wage discrimination.  
 
We have undertaken two further steps in our analysis to assess the robustness of these results. First, 
we have examined whether our results change much when we partition the sample in terms of firm 
size.  Second,  we  go  beyond  the  simple  distinction  between  men  and  women  and  consider  the 
interaction of status (blue-collar/white collar) and gender. Referring to equations 6 and 9, this means 
estimating these models with k=0,1,2,3 categories of workers, where the reference category in our 
case  (k=0)  are  the  blue-collar  men.    Note  in  particular  that  the  white  vs.  blue-collar  workers 
comparison is a way to somehow compensate for the lack of information on the level of education 
(which is one shortcoming of our data). For each of these extensions, the focus will be on the results 
of  the  model  with  intermediate  inputs  à-la-LP  with  firm  fixed  effects  (exploiting  within-firm 
variance). We also resort to both system FGLS (Table 5, panel A) and system OLS (Table 5, panel 
B) to assess the null hypothesis of no gender wage discrimination (λ = ʦ). 
                                                 
25   The same could be said of part-time employment, but remember that we explicitly control for the latter by including 
average hours worked per employee (part-time or full-time employees confounded) in all our estimations. 28 
The main results from these breakdowns do not differ in qualitative terms from those obtained using 
the overall sample.  Whatever the method used (system FGLS or system OLS), we conclude to the 
absence of systematic gender discrimination when consider the breakdown according to white- vs. 
blue-collar  status.    Female  workers  get  paid  in  relative  terms  slightly  more  than  their  relative 
productivity,  which  leads  to  the  negative  gaps  reported  in  Table  5.A  and  5.B.  Yet,  these  are 
generally  not  statistically  significant.  It  if  only  in  large  firms  (100+)  that  we  find  evidence 
supportive of gender discrimination. Our system OLS estimate suggest a positive gap of about 6 
percentage point, though the coefficient is not statistically significant (i.e. productivity higher than 
labour costs for women). System FGLS delivers a positive gap of 15 percentage points that is 
statistically significant, but only at the 1% level.  29 
Table 3: Separate estimation of Production Function and Labour Costs Equation 
Method:  1-OLS  2-Between  3-Intermediate 
inputs (Levinsohn-
Petrin) 
4-First-Differences   5-Within (firm 
fixed effects) 





Share Women  -0.045***  0.014  -0.021*  -0.068*  -0.072**  -0.103*** 
p-value  0.0000  0.4897  0.0348  0.0163  0.0025  0,0002 
Controls  capital. number of 
employees. hours 
worked per 
employee + fixed 
effects: year. nace1. 
region 
capital. number of 
employees. hours 
worked per 
employee + fixed 
effects: year. nace1. 
region 
capital. number of 
employees. hours 
worked per 
employee + fixed 
effects: firm 
capital. number of 
employees. hours 
worked per 
employee + fixed 
effects: firm 
capital. number of 
employees. hours 
worked per 
employee + fixed 
effects: firm 
capital. number of 
employees. hours 
worked per 
employee + fixed 
effects: firm 
Nobs.  59 980  59 980  49 582  49 395  59 980  49 575 
Labour-cost equation 
Share Women  -0.171***  -0.117***  -0.131***  -0.013  -0.063***  -0.065*** 
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.3814  0.0000  0.0000 
Controls   hours worked per 
employee+ fixed 
effects: year. nace1. 
region 
 hours worked per 
employee+ fixed 
effects: year. nace1. 
region 
 hours worked per 
employee+ fixed 
effects: year. nace1. 
region 
fixed effects: firm. 
year 
fixed effects: firm. 
year 
fixed effects: firm. 
year 
Nobs.  60 713    60 713    49 581    50 110    60 713    49 581   
Productivity vs labour cost differentials 
Productivity diff. (λ)  0.95  1.02  0.98  0.90  0.91  0.87 
Labour costs diff. (ʦ)  0.83  0.88  0.87  0.99  0.94  0.94 
Gap (λ-ʦ)  0.12  0.13  0.11  -0.09  -0.03  -0.06 
 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4: Joint estimates of productivity and labour costs differentials. Within (firm fixed effects) + 














System FGLS  0.936  0.941  -0.005  0.04  0.8473 
            System OLS  0.881  0.941  -0.060   1.14  0.2863 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
a:Simultaneous estimation accounting for possible correlation between residuals 
b:Equations are estimated separately 
 
Table 5: Joint estimates of productivity and labour costs differentials. Breakdown by firm size and 
labour market status (p-values in italics). Within (firm fixed effects)+ intermediate inputs 





Production diff. (λ):   Labour-cost diff 
(ʦ)  Gap (λ-ʦ) 





Firm size  ref=men  ref=men 
      1-49  0.86  0.91  -0.046  1.84  0.1744 
50-99  0.96  0.93  0.029  0.26  0.6134 
>=100  1.21  1.06  0.151*  5.47  0.0193 
Gender/Status  ref=blue-collar men  ref=blue-collar men 
      blue-collar women  0.84  0.88  -0.041   0.97  0.3246 
white-collar women  1.20  1.23  -0.025   0.65  0.4186 
white-collar men  1.35  1.41  -0.056*   4.33  0.0374 





Production diff. (λ): 
ref=men 
Labour-cost diff 
(ʦ): ref=men  Gap (λ-ʦ) 





Firm size  ref=men  ref=men 
      1-49  0.75  0.91  -0.154*  4.71  0.0300 
50-99  0.86  0.93  -0.071    0.36   0.5459 
>=100  1.12  1.06  0.059   0.21  0.6483 
Gender/Status  ref=blue-collar men  ref=blue-collar men 
      blue-collar women  0.80  0.83  -0.026    0.61   0.4356 
white-collar women  0.96  1.16  -0.202   2.53  0.1120 
white-collar men  1.09  1.32  -0.231  2.22  0.1366 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
a:Simultaneous estimation accounting for possible correlation between residuals 
b:Equations are estimated separately, but the estimates are used to construct a cluster-adjusted robust sandwich variance-
covariance matrix. 
c: See appendix for a presentation of NACE2 codes corresponding to these categories 
 
5.3 Interpretation of Results  
 
In interpreting the above empirical results it is helpful to bear in mind the benchmark definition of 
gender  wage  discrimination  presented  in  Section  2.1:  identifying  market-wide  and  statistically 
significant gaps between gender productivity differentials and gender wage differentials.  Recall 
that Hellerstein &Neumark (1995) empirical methodology does not provide a direct test of any 
particular theory of gender wage discrimination, rather, it supplies an empirical measure of the 
above benchmark concept of gender wage discrimination.  
 
Nevertheless, although the Hellerstein &Neumark methodology does not provide a direct test for 
any particular theory of gender wage discrimination, we can still check which theories of gender 
wage discrimination are consistent with our empirical findings. Our core findings based on within-
firm variation and the various extensions we carried out considering both firm- or worker traits (i.e. 
size  and  blue-  or  white-collar  status)  indicate  that  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  gender  wage 
discrimination  holds.  Indeed,  although  our  results  indicate  that  male  and  female  labour  do  not 
provide the same services in the each firm, insofar as women, as a group, are significantly less 
productive than men, they do not reject the hypothesis that women get paid according to their lower 
productivity with respect to men.  32 
6 Conclusion  
In this paper we used firm-level data from a matched employer-employee data set to test for the 
presence of gender wage discrimination in the Belgian labour market. We identified gender wage 
discrimination  from  within-firm  variation  and  used  Levinsohn  and  Petrin  (2003)  structural 
production function estimator to control for the endogeneity in input choice. Our findings indicate 
that, on average, women earn 6% less than men but also that they are collectively 6-12% less 
productive than men. 
The results of the implementation of the Wald test of equality of the gender wage differential and 
the gender productivity differential — or of the statistical significance of productivity-to-wage gap, 
ranging from 0 to -6 percentage points — lead us to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis that, 
under  the  assumptions  of  spot  labour  markets  and  cost-minimizing  firms,  women  are  not 
systematically discriminated against in earnings in the Belgian labour market.  
In  essence,  these  findings  are  consistent  with  the  prediction  of  Becker  (1957)  that  they  are 
efficiency  costs  associated  with  gender-biased  preferences  by  employers,  and  that  competition 
should eliminate wage discrimination in the long run. The estimates of the gender labour costs 
differential we obtained also accord with those obtained in empirical studies using Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions based on wage equations to explain the sources of gender differences in pay in the 
Belgian labour market (Rycx & Tojerow, 2002),. More importantly, due to the ability of Hellerstein 
& Neumark‟s methodology to supply a direct test for the gender wage discrimination hypothesis, 
we contribute with new evidence to the research programme dedicated to explaining the sources of 
the  gender  pay  gap.  Because  we  use  firm-level  data  we  are  indeed  able  to  estimate  gender 
productivity differences alongside the traditional gender wage/labour costs differences, and show 
that the two are approximately aligned. 
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Annex : Sectors (Industry, Commerce and Service) and NACE2 codes/definitions 
10="I_Industries alimentaires " 
11="I_Fabrication de boissons" 
12="I_Fabrication de produits à base de tabac" 
13="I_Fabrication de textiles" 
14="I_Industrie de l'habillement" 
15="I_Industrie du cuir et de la chaussure" 
16="I_Travail du bois et fabrication d'articles en bois et en liège, à l'exception des meubles; fabrication 
d'articles en vannerie et sparterie" 
17="I_Industrie du papier et du carton" 
18="I_Imprimerie et reproduction d'enregistrements" 
19="I_Cokéfaction et raffinage" 
20="I_Industrie chimique" 
21="I_Industrie pharmaceutique" 
22="I_Fabrication de produits en caoutchouc et en plastique" 
23="I_Fabrication d'autres produits minéraux non métalliques" 
24="I_Métallurgie" 
25="I_Fabrication de produits métalliques, à l'exception des machines et des équipements" 
26="I_Fabrication de produits informatiques, électroniques et optiques" 
27="I_Fabrication d'équipements électriques" 
28="I_Fabrication de machines et d'équipements n.c.a." 
29="I_Construction et assemblage de véhicules automobiles, de remorques et de semi-remorques" 
30="I_Fabrication d'autres matériels de transport" 
31="I_Fabrication de meubles" 
32="I_Autres industries manufacturières" 
33="I_Réparation et installation de machines et d'équipements" 
35="I_Production et distribution d'électricité, de gaz, de vapeur et d'air conditionné" 
36="I_Captage, traitement et distribution d'eau" 
37="I_Collecte et traitement des eaux usées" 
38="I_Collecte, traitement et élimination des déchets; récupération" 
39="I_Dépollution et autres services de gestion des déchets" 
41="I_Construction de bâtiments; promotion immobilière" 
42="I_Génie civil" 
43="I_Travaux de construction spécialisés" 
45="C_Commerce de gros et de détail et réparation véhicules automobiles et de motocycles" 
46="C_Commerce de gros, à l'exception des véhicules automobiles et des motocycles" 
47="C_Commerce de détail, à l'exception des véhicules automobiles et des motocycles" 
49="S_Transports terrestres et transport par conduites" 
50="S_Transports par eau" 
51="S_Transports aériens" 
52="S_Entreposage et services auxiliaires des transports" 




59="S_Production de films cinématographiques, de vidéo et de programmes de télévision; 
enregistrement sonore et édition musicale" 
60="S_Programmation et diffusion de programmes de radio et de télévision" 
61="S_Télécommunications" 
62="S_Programmation, conseil et autres activités informatiques" 
63="S_Services d'information" 
64="S_Activités des services financiers, hors assurance et caisses de retraite" 
65="S_Assurance, réassurance et caisses de retraite, à l'exclusion des assurances sociales obligatoires" 
66="S_Activités auxiliaires de services financiers et d'assurance" 
68="S_Activités immobilières" 
69="S_Activités juridiques et comptables" 
70="S_Activités des sièges sociaux; conseil de gestion" 
71="S_Activités d'architecture et d'ingénierie; activités de contrôle et analyses techniques" 
72="S_Recherche-développement scientifique" 
73="S_Publicité et études de marché" 
74="S_Autres activités spécialisées, scientifiques et techniques" 
75="S_Activités vétérinaires" 
77="S_Activités de location et location-bail" 
78="S_Activités liées à l'emploi" 
79="S_Activités des agences de voyage, voyagistes, services de réservation et activités connexes" 
80="S_Enquêtes et sécurité" 
81="S_Services relatifs aux bâtiments; aménagement paysager" 
82="S_Services administratifs de bureau et autres activités de soutien aux entreprises" 
92="S_Organisation de jeux de hasard et d'argent" 
93="S_Activités sportives, récréatives et de loisirs" 
94="S_Activités des organisations associatives" 
95="S_Réparation d'ordinateurs et de biens personnels et domestiques" 
96="S_Autres services personnels" 
97="S_Activités des ménages en tant qu'employeurs de personnel domestique" 
98="S_Activités indifférenciées des ménages en tant que producteurs de biens et services pour usage 
propre" 
99="S_Activités des organisations et organismes extraterritoriaux" 
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